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Abstract
We propose a general equilibrium framework that highlights the interaction of reserve
requirements and a conventional monetary policy in a model that combines endogenous
housing loan defaults and financial intermediation frictions due to the costs of enforcing
contracts. We use the model to examine how the interaction of these policies affect (i) the
credit and business cycle; (ii) the distribution of welfare between savers and borrowers; (iii)
the overall welfare objectives when monetary and macroprudential policies are optimised
together or separately. We find that models with an optimised reserve ratio rule are effective
in reducing the sudden boom and bust of credit and the business cycle. We also find that
there are a distributive implications of the introduction of reserve ratio where borrowers gain
at the expense of savers. However, there is no difference in the overall welfare results whether
monetary and macroprudential policies are optimised together or separately.
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1 Introduction
The suddenness and severity of the global financial crisis (GFC) and the challenges it created for
central banks, has led many researchers to consider whether monetary policy alone can ensure
economic and financial stability. Studies by Agenor, Alper and da Silva (2018), Angeloni and
Faia (2013), Benes and Kumhof (2015), Collard et al. (2017), Christensen, Meh and Moran
(2011), Silvo (2019), and Paries, Sørensen and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2018) all analyse the
interaction of monetary policy and capital regulations. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014),
Beau, Clerc and Mojon (2012), and Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2013) evaluate the
interaction of monetary policy and loan-to-value (LTV). Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014),
Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa and Makarski (2015), and Suh (2012) consider the interaction of
monetary policy, capital regulations, and LTV ratio. Paoli and Paustian (2017) investigates
the interaction between monetary policy, LTV ratios with taxes on both borrowing and deposits
and Gelain, Lansing and Mendicino (2012) with loan-to-income (LTI) ratios. Bailliu, Meh and
Zhang (2015), Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012), Ozkan, Unsal et al. (2013), Quint and Rabanal
(2014), Suh (2014), and Unsal (2013) interact monetary policy with a short cut representation
of macroprudential policy. Generally, these studies all find that augmenting monetary policy
with macroprudential tools can be sufficient for ensuring both economic and financial stability.
While the reserve ratio is an important element of macroprudential policy, only a few studies,
such as Medina and Roldós (2018), and Tavman (2015), have analysed how it interacts with
monetary policy. Moreover their models do not explicitly include a housing sector even though
evidence in Leamer (2015) and Leamer (2007) suggests that housing is the single most important
driver of U.S. business cycles. The Euro area is not an exception as shown in Figure 1.
This motivates our development of a general equilibrium framework in which a reserve
requirement rule operates alongside conventional monetary policy in a model with a housing
sector in addition to the sector that produces nondurable consumption. We combine a version
of the financial accelerator model in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) used by Quint and
Rabanal (2014) to model endogenous loan defaults in the housing sector with the model of
Gertler and Karadi (2011) who introduced a a financial intermediation friction via the impact
of funds available to banks.1 We then augment the model by introducing a reserve requirement
that regulates how much of its deposit funds a bank can allocate to lending. We use this model
to examine how the interaction between monetary policy and reserve requirements affect: (i) the
credit and business cycle; (ii) the distribution of welfare between savers and borrowers; and (iii)
1Quint and Rabanal (2014) captures how changes in the balance sheet of borrowers due to house price
fluctuations caused by idiosyncratic risk shock affects the spread between lending and deposit rates, and the
credit market.
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Source: Federal Reserves Economic Data (FRED), St. Louis Fed.
the aggregate welfare when these policies are optimised together or separately. Our model is
closely based on Quint and Rabanal (2014), but our explicit use of the reserve ratio and addition
of a formal banking sector in the model enables us to compare our results with the former. The
model is calibrated using euro area data.2
As early as 1820, banks in New York and New England agreed to redeem each others’
notes provided the issuing bank maintained a sufficient deposit of specie (gold or its equivalent)
on account with the redeeming bank (Feinman (1993)). The first legal requirements were
introduced in the US by the states of Virginia, Georgia, and New York following the Panic
of 1837 (Carlson (2018)), implemented nationwide in 1863 with passage of the National Bank
Act and incorporated within the 1913 Federal Reserve Act (Goodfriend and Hargraves (1983)).
Given this history, it is notable that alongside the growing emphasis on macroprudential
policy, developed economies have increasingly lowered or eliminated the reserve requirements.
In the euro area the required reserve ratio was set at two percent from 1999 until its reduction
to one percent in 2012. In the UK, the Bank of England no longer uses required reserve ratios
as a policy tool. On 26 March 2020, two centuries after they were introduced, the United States
2As in Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) and Beau, Clerc and Mojon (2012), we do not distinguish between
different countries within the euro area, but rather treat the euro area as a single economy.
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Federal Reserve Board eliminated the reserve requirements for all depository institutions.3 Our
results suggest that these changes may have been ill-advised and that the reintroduction of
reserve requirements may ultimately be warranted.
This analysis produces five main results. First, we considered the model with only monetary
policy as the benchmark and show the distributive implications of operating the different levels
of static reserve ratio in stochastic model and deterministic model. We find that there is a welfare
trade-off between borrowers and savers. In both cases, borrowers tend to increase welfare gains
as reserve ratio increases. By contrast, savers tend to decrease welfare as the level of reserve
ratio increases. In aggregate, total household welfare exhibit a minimal gain given that the
gains by borrowers offset the losses by savers. These results underscore that a higher reserve
ratio increases costs for banks as only a portion of the available deposits can be used for lending
activities. As banks have fewer funds to lend, they also reduce excessive risk-taking. By doing
so, they are able to eliminate extending loans to subprime borrowers and thereby reduce the
probability of default. However, banks accumulate less profits in the process which are then
remitted to savers as owners of banks. Savers also earn lower returns on deposits as lower funds
are intermediated. Meanwhile, worthy borrowers enjoy a stable flow of credit as probability of
default decrease with higher reserve ratio. This narrative reflects why savers experience welfare
losses and borrowers increase welfare gains when the reserve ratio increases.
Second, we look at whether situations might arise where two different agencies, a central
bank setting monetary policy and a macroprudential policy agency might cooperate, or given
the different tools at their disposal, operate independently without any cooperation in a way
that might be detrimental to stability or welfare. We compute the parameters associated with
both the monetary and macroprudential policy rules that optimise total welfare. We use the
consumer welfare as a goal rather than the stabilisation objectives of the monetary authority and
macroprudential regulator. Since both agencies are maximising consumer welfare, what emerges
is a team solution, so that the optimal parameters for both cases are the same. This contrasts
with Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) where the optimal parameters in the cooperative and
noncooperative cases differ because the objective functions of the two policymakers are different.
Third, we use the optimised parameters to generate the impulse response functions (IRFs)
in response to the two of three shocks associated with the housing sector that together account
for 43% of the variance in real GDP and nearly all the variance in loans. We demonstrates that
macroprudential policy, even if it operates completely on its own, stabilises the economy when
negative risk shock hits, by dampening the financial accelerator mechanism. Macroprudential
policy, either on its own or when combined with monetary policy, stabilises the economy and
3Reserves Administration Frequently Asked Questions;
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm.
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more generally generates a small welfare benefit to borrowers at the expense of savers. This
differential impact increases as the ratio shifts higher. Meanwhile, the response of the economy
to a negative shock to the housing preference parameter is similar to the impact from the risk
shock, but GDP carries on declining for another quarter. Neither macroprudential policy nor
monetary policy when operating in the absence of the other are able to do much to mitigate the
impact of the demand shock. Only when they operate in tandem in is there a discernible impact
on the economy—particularly in reducing the drop in total loans. Turning to the nondurable
goods sector, we find that neither macroprudential policy or monetary policy, when operating in
the absence of the other, are able to do much to mitigate the impact of a nondurable technology
shock. We also consider the impact of a negative demand shock in the non-durable sector. The
negative impact on consumption for savers and borrowers is roughly similar though the latter do
recover more quickly. Unlike the case for the technology shock, the demand shock on nondurable
inflation generates countercyclical declines in both the policy rate and the reserve ratio.
Fourth, we also analyse the welfare effects of the different regimes compare to a baseline
model with no policy. We find that monetary policy, when analysed in New Keynesian models,
is generally found to mitigate but only to a small degree, the negative impacts on agents’ welfare
generated by stochastic shocks to the economy. We also find that at the baseline steady state
reserve requirement of 10%, the total impact on welfare of macroprudential policy, either on
its own, or in conjunction with monetary policy, reaches consumption equivalents of 0.003% or
0.006% respectively. If the steady state reserve requirement is set as high as 30% the consumption
equivalents are 0.014% and 0.017%, well over an order of magnitude higher than the impact of
monetary policy alone. These are still small numbers, but they demonstrate that once we
incorporate housing and banks into our model, macroprudential policy is more effective than
monetary policy in mitigating the welfare effects of shocks.
Lastly, we demonstrate how much can these different regimes reduce the volatility of key
macroeconomic and financial variables. We find that the reduction in the loss function is largest
when monetary and macroprudential policy operate together and the reserve ratio is highest.
Monetary policy, combined with macroprudential policy implemented with the low steady state
reserve requirement we observe in the Eurozone, achieves a reduction in the loss function nearly
as large as macroprudential policy when it operates on its own with the much higher reserve
requirement.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief description of the model and in
Section 3 we discuss the calibration of its structural and stochastic parameters. In Section 4
we analyse the behaviour of the model and consider the welfare implications of different policy
choices. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
Consider a one-country closed economy dynamic stochastic general equilibirum (DSGE) model
that combines a balance sheet constraint from Quint and Rabanal (2014) with financial frictions
modeled by Gertler and Karadi (2011). Figure 2 provides a description of the feedback
mechanism of the model by showing the flow of transactions among the agents. The model has
two sectors, non-durable consumption and housing, and heterogeneous households, the savers
and borrowers in equilibrium with discount factor of β and βB, respectively, where β > βB.
Merging the two models allows us to understand the role of banks that intermediate funds from
savers to borrowers (with reserve ratio that regulate the supply of credit) and face balance sheet
constraints. These constraints originate with the endogenous loan defaults of borrowers caused
by idiosyncratic shocks to their housing collateral. The two final goods in this economy, non-
durables and housing are produced in perfectly competitive markets, by combining together
different sets of intermediate goods. The intermediate goods are produced by two different
sets of monopolistically competitive firms associated with each sector. Private banks too, are
monopolistically competitive and there are also collection agencies, that banks engage for a
fee, to recover a portion of any loans in default. The central bank conducts monetary policy
according to a Taylor rule and sets the reserve ratio for banks. We abstract from fiscal policy.
2.1 Savers
Savers indexed by j ∈ [0, λ] maximize expected utility by choosing non-durable consumption,






















where the parameter ε measures the external habit on past total non-durable goods consumption
while β, γ, and ϕ stand for the discount factor, the share of non-durable goods in the utility
function, and the inverse elasticity of labour, respectively. There is also a preference shock ξk,
where k = C,D, which follow an AR(1) process with zero mean.




1+ιL + (1− α)−ιL(LD,jt )1+ιL
] 1
1+ιL , (2)
where LC,jt denotes non-durable sector and L
D,j
t housing sector, with α as share of employment
in the non-durable sector. Reallocating labour across sectors is costly and is governed by
parameters ιL.
Saver households face a budget constraint which we express in real terms:
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Figure 2: Model Interactions






















is the price of housing relative to the non-durable final consumption good. Real
wages paid in the two sectors are denoted by WCt and W
D
t . Savers allocate their expenditures
between real non-durable consumption Cjt and housing investment I
j
t . They can save by holding
deposits in the financial system Sjt , which pay a gross nominal deposit interest rate Rt, converted
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to a real rate by dividing by non-durable consumption inflation ΠCt . In addition, savers also
receive profits Ψjt from intermediate goods producers in the housing and non-durable sectors,
from the banks they manage, and from debt-collection agencies that collect fees from banks to
recover defaulting loans.
The housing stock Djt , accumulates through housing investment I
j
t by savers:










where δ denotes the rate of depreciation for the housing stock and f(·) is an adjustment cost
function. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005b), f(·) is a convex function, which
in steady state satisfies: f̄ = f̄ ′ = 0 and f̄ ′′ > 0.4
Defining the stochastic discount factor as Pt,t+1 ≡ β Pt+1Pt , the first order conditions (FOCs)



























































The borrowers in this economy, indexed by j ∈ [λ, 1], also maximise their expected utility with






















4The cost function is important to replicate hump-shaped responses of residential investment to shock and
reduce residential investment volatiliy.
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We define F (ω̄, σ̄ω) as the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the idiosyncratic shock
to the quality of the housing stock. Hence, the budget constraint, in real terms, aggregated
across all borrowers, incorporates both the fraction F (ω̄, σ̄ω)=
∫ ω̄
0 dF (ω, σω)dω of households
that receive shocks to the quality of their housing below the threshold ω̄ and default on their
loans, and the fraction 1 − F (ω̄, σ̄ω)=
∫∞
ω̄ dF (ω, σω)dω that receive shocks above the threshold


















where RDt = G(ω̄, σ̄ω)
QtDBt
SBt−1
is the rate that is paid to banks after a debt-collection agency
intervenes. Borrowers receive no income from profits.
Defining the stochastic discount factor as PBt,t+1 ≡ β
PBt+1
PBt





RDt+1 + (1− F (ω̄, σ̄ω))RLt
































































An endogenous default risk is introduced in the model similar with Quint and Rabanal
(2014), which was originally introduced by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The risk
is introduced in the credit and housing market by assuming an idiosyncratic quality shock to
value of the housing stock of each borrower household, which is use as collateral for their loans.
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However, similar with the former, we do not model asymmetric information or agency problems.
Borrowers will only default if they are hit by a shock that would make the value of their housing
stock lower than their outstanding debts.
This idiosyncratic shock is log-normally distributed: log(ωjt ) ∼ N(µω, σ2ω,t) where setting
µω = −12σ
2
ω,t ensures that E(ω
j














The standard deviation of the housing quality shock σω,t follows is an AR(1) process in logs:
log(σω,t) = (1− ρσω)log(σ̄ω) + ρσω log(σω,t−1) + uω,t (17)
where uω,t ∼ (0, σuω) follows the log normal distribution on the support (0,∞), so ω
j
t is always
positive. Any rise in σω,t is mean-preserving and only increases the skewness of the distribution,
resulting in more of the mass of the distribution concentrated on the left and lower values for ωjt .
As a result, the probability of mortgage default increases, necessitating banks to charge higher
spreads.
The shock ωjt equals the ex-ante threshold default value ω̄
a
t if the expected value of the
housing stock exactly matches the gross interest payment on the loan. We defined DBt as the





















As in Quint and Rabanal (2014), the one-period lending rate RLt−1 is pre-determined and not
a function of the state of the economy and since investment increases the housing stock with a
lag, DBt is also a predetermined variable. Therefore the housing risk, ex-ante ω̄
a
t and ex-post




t . Ex-post, borrowers
hit by shocks above and below the the threshold ω̄pt−1 face different budget constraints. High



















The fraction of loans that banks expect to default in period t + 1, equals the CDF of the
quality shock:






















Since the expected value of the quality shock conditional on being less than the threshold ω̄pt−1














The banking sector in this model closely follows that of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) but
embeds the New Keynesian (NK) model of sticky prices similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Specifically, banks in our model face costs associated with enforcing contracts in an environment
where financial frictions also limit the funds available to banks from savers. To these two
elements, we add an additional friction in the form of a reserve ratio, which rations the funds
available for banks to purchase perfect state-contingent securities.
Banks operate in a monopolistic competitive environment where they adjust the deposit
and lending rates in response to shocks or the cyclical conditions of the economy. Banks pay
depositors a gross interest rate Rt and extend loans to borrowers at a gross rate R
L
t against the
future value of their housing collateral. Banks introduce a wedge between the cost of deposits
from savers Rt, and the average interest rate banks receive for the loans they choose to make,
subject to the required reserve ratio, RDt +(1−F )RLt−1. Banks will tend to increase the loanable
amount they issue in a credit boom environment while decreasing it when times are uncertain.
The reserve ratio limits riskier credit activity during booms.
The activity of banks can be summarised in two phases. First, banks raise deposits, an
average of St, from each saver at a deposit rate Rt+1 over the interval [t, t+ 1]. These deposits
and the internal equity nt they raise from households serve as the banks’ liabilities. Banks retain
a certain amount of unremunerated reserves rrt from the deposits it receive from households.
In the second phase, banks use these liabilities to make loans averaging SBt to each borrower.
The housing they purchase serves as collateral.
The total amount of assets against which the loans are obtained is the end-of-period housing
stock Dt in (3). The lending rate for those who fully repay is known in advance and is a
contractual obligation, while the average return on those loans that default is only known at
5See Quint and Rabanal (2014) Appendix for the complete derivation.
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time t. A bank’s balance sheet is summarised by:
(1− λ)SBt ≤ nt + λ(1− rrt)St, (24)
while the net worth of the banks accumulates according to:
nt+1 = (1− λ)
[
(1− µ)RDt+1 + (1− F )RLt
]
SBt − λ(Rt+1 − rrt)St. (25)
















If default occurs, banks call in debt-collection agencies which return the fraction (1−µ) of the
realised value of borrower j’s housing stock and retain the fraction µ in fees, which is distributed
as profits to savers. Banks each face an exit probability 1 − σB each period and therefore exit
in the ith period with probability (1 − σB)σi−1B . As banks only pay dividends when they exit,




(1− σB)σi−1B Pt,t+int+i, (28)
where Pt,t+i = β
iPC,t+i
PC,t
is the stochastic discount factor, subject to an incentive constraint for
savers to be willing to supply funds to the banks.















We assume that after a bank obtains funds and complies with the required reserve ratio,
the bank’s owner may transfer a fraction Θ of the assets not held as reserves to his family,
causing the bank to default on its debts and shut down. In recognition of the possibility that
as much as Θ(1 − λ)SBt of the bank’s assets could be diverted for personal gain—leaving only
(1−Θ)(1− λ)SBt to be reclaimed by creditors—households limit the funds they lend to banks.
To ensure that banks do not divert funds, a bank’s franchise value Vt must be at least as large
as its gain from diverting funds:
Vt ≥ Θ(1− λ)SBt . (30)
6A simpler solution in Pearlman (2015) is to assume that Vt = ΩtEt[Pt,t+1nt+1].
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The right-hand side of this incentive constraint is what the bank’s owner gains by diverting
a fraction of assets and the left-hand side is what is lost from diverting funds. The optimisation
problem for the bank is to choose a path for loans {SBt+i} which maximises Vt subject to (24),
(25) and (30). The solution is assumed to take the form:
Vt = EtΩt+1Pt,t+1nt+1. (31)
The value of the bank at the end of period t− 1 satisfies the Bellman equation:
Vt−1 = Et−1Pt−1,t[(1− σB)nt + σBVt]. (32)
Substituting (29) and (31), into (30) and (32) yields the dynamic programming problem:







































≥ Θ, then the constraint (34) does not




, is indeterminate. Assume
instead that the constraint does bind, the value function is then7:
Vt−1 = Et−1Pt−1,tnt
[
















Aggregating (24), the balance sheet for the banking sector as a whole is:
(1− λ)SBt = Nt + λ(1− rrt)St, (36)





The net worth of all the banks founded before time t and survive to period t is N0,t and it
equals the earnings on all the assets SBt−1 of all the banks that operated in the previous period,
7Our derivation of this result arises from solving what is in effect a simple linear programming problem; it
eliminates the Lagrangian utilised by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
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after subtracting the cost of deposit finance and complying with the reserve ratio requirement,





(1− µ)RDt + (1− F )RLt−1
]
SBt−1 − λ(Rt − rrt−1)St−1
}
(38)
The new banks, those founded in period t, raise equity from households in an amount equal
to the fraction ξB/(1− σB) of the total value of assets held by banks that exited at the end of










Summing (38) and (39) yields the net worth of the banking sector:








− σBλ(Rt − rrt−1)St−1 (40)
2.4 Firms
Firms in both the homogeneous non-durable final consumption sector and the housing sector
operate in perfectly competitive markets with flexible prices. Producers in each sector purchase
sector-specific intermediate goods that exist in a continuum and are imperfect substitutes and










, k = C,D (41)
where σk > 1 represents the price elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
The final goods firm chooses Yt(i) to minimize its costs and so the demand function for








Y kt , k = C,D (42)








, k = C,D (43)
The two markets for intermediate goods are monopolistically competitive and price setting
is staggered as in Calvo (1983). In each period only a fraction 1− θC (1− θD) of intermediate
goods producers in the non-durable (housing) sector receive a signal to re-optimize their price.
For the remaining fraction θC (θD), their prices are partially indexed to lagged sector-specific
inflation (with a coefficient φC , φD in each sector). In both sectors, intermediate goods are
produced solely with labour and subject to sector-specific stationary technology shocks ZCt and
ZDt , each of which follows a zero-mean AR(1) process in logs:




t , k = C,D (44)
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Each intermediate goods producers solves a standard Calvo model profit-maximization problem











































































, k = C,D (51)
Producers of the intermediate good used in the production of the nondurable consumption good
solve (47), (48) and (51) and their counterparts in the intermediate goods sector that supplies
the housing sector (49), (50) and (51).
2.5 Monetary and Macroprudential Policy




















Similarly, there is a separate macroprudential authority that imposes a required reserve ratio
rrt to limit the ability of banks to engage in risky lending. Traditionally, required reserve ratios
have been imposed as a floor on bank reserves, but in recent years, with the introduction of
negative interest rates on excess reserves they also represent a type of ceiling. Reflecting this,
the reserve requirement is a target relative to a steady state reserve ratio r̄r set to 10% –
according to Gray (2011) this is the average required reserve ratio for most countries that use
a reserve ratio as a policy instrument. We also follow Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015) in
setting the macroprudential policy rule to includes credit growth SBt, relative house prices Qt,



















2.6 Market Clearing Conditions
In the non-durable sector, production is equal to demand by savers Ct and borrowers C
B
t :
Y Ct = λCt + (1− λ)CBt . (54)
Production in the housing goods sector is equal to the residential investments of savers and
borrowers:







and the total hours worked in each sector equals the aggregate supply of labour:
∫ 1
0
Lkt dk = λ
∫ 1
0
Lk,jt dj + (1− λ)
∫ n
0
LB,k,jdj, k = C,D (57)
3 Calibration
3.1 Structural Parameters
Table 1 lists the calibrated values of the 27 structural parameters in the model. Mostly, the
parameter values match the quarterly data estimates in Quint and Rabanal (2014) for the core
members of the euro area.8 Parameters for the banking sector are calibrated using Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010). The probability σB is chosen so that the banks survive on average eight
years (32 quarters). Parameters for divertable assets and transfers to new banks, Θ and ξB,
respectively, are computed to match an economy-wide leverage ratio of four, an average credit
spread of 100 basis points per year, and as mentioned above, a reserve ratio of ten percent.
3.2 Stochastic Parameters
The business cycle movements in this model are driven by seven stochastic shocks to: non-
durable and housing preferences, non-durable and housing technology, housing risk, monetary
policy, and the reserve ratio. All follow an AR(1) process in logs.9 The shock processes are
calibrated using the estimates in Quint and Rabanal (2014) to match the standard moments of
the euro area data and presented in Table 2.
8Except for βB which is adopted from Pearlman (2015) - in turn based on values in the literature.
9The monetary policy shock is assumed to be white noise.
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Table 1: Calibrated structural parameters
Parameters Value Definition
Households
β 0.99 Discount rate for savers
βB 0.96 Discount rate for borrowers
γ 0.7368 Share of non-durable consumption in utility
ε 0.72 External habit formation for savers
εB 0.46 External habit formation for borrowers
ϕ 0.37 Inverse elasticity of labour supply
ιL 0.72 Cost of reallocating labour across sector
δ 0.0125 Depreciation rate
ψ 1.75 Investment adjustment cost
α 0.94 Size of non-durable sector in GDP
λ 0.61 Fraction of savers in total population
Firms
θC 0.62 Calvo lottery non-durables goods
θD 0.64 Calvo lottery housing goods
φC 0.15 Indexation non-durables goods
φD 0.25 Indexation housing goods
σC 10 Elasticity of substitution non-durable goods
σD 10 Elasticity of substitution housing goods
Banks
µ 0.2 Share of housing value paid to debt-collection agency
σB 0.9688 Proportion of bankers that survive
ξB 0.0026 Transfers to new bankers
Θ 0.3841 Proportion of divertable assets
Monetary and Macroprudential
r̄r 0.1 Steady-state reserve ratio
φ 4.0 Steady state leverage ratio
spread 0.0025 Interest spread target
ρr 0.8 Interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule
φπ 1.56 Response to inflation in Taylor rule
φy 0.2 Response to output growth in Taylor rule
17
Table 2: Calibrated stochastic shocks
Parameters Value Description
ρZD 0.86 Productivity shock housing-autocorrelation
ρZC 0.79 Productivity shock non-durable-autocorrelation
ρξD 0.98 Preference shock housing-autocorrelation
ρξC 0.66 Preference shock non-durable-autocorrelation
ρω 0.84 Idiosyncratic housing quality shock-autocorrelation
σZD 0.0162 Productivity shock housing-standard deviation
σZC 0.0062 Productivity shock non-durable-standard deviation
σξD 0.0309 Preference shock housing-standard deviation
σξC 0.0187 Preference shock non-durable-standard deviation
σω 0.1179 Idiosyncratic housing quality shock-standard deviation
σM 0.0012 Monetary shock-standard deviation
3.3 Variance Decomposition
To analyse the behaviour of the model, we start by decomposing the contribution of each of the
six stochastic shocks to the variance of the model’s most salient variables as presented in Table
3.10 There are four shocks out of the six that generate nearly all the variance in real GDP,
with 67% resulting from the two demand shocks (nondurable goods and housing preferences).
In terms of the shocks associated with the housing sector, the demand shock for housing is the
second most important, accounting for 30.99% of the variance, the shock to housing quality
11.55%, while productivity in that sector accounts for only 1.59%. Taken together, the three
shocks associated with housing account for nearly half (44.35%) the variance associated with
the business cycle, matching the observations made in Leamer (2007) and Leamer (2015).
Shocks to the demand for housing generate 79.93% of the variance in credit and together
with the shock to housing quality drive nearly 100% of the credit cycle. Housing investment as
a whole is largely driven by shocks to the demand for housing (81.60%) and then sector supply
shocks (18.68%), but not by quality shocks. These results are also consistent with estimates
by Musso, Neri and Stracca (2011), and Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa and Makarski (2015), which
find that changes in monetary policy have little effect on housing investment whereas, shocks to
housing quality generate more than half the variance in the policy interest rate. Indeed, outside
of their direct impact on the policy rate, monetary shocks have little effect on the economy
beyond their impact on the inflation rate for nondurable consumption. At the same time, the
10Historically, central banks do not change reserve ratios frequently. Hence, when calculating the variance



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Welfare in Consumption Equivalent in Stochastic Model
quality shocks account for nearly all the variance in the net worth of banks (82.44%) and the
interest rate they charge borrowers (93.57%).
3.4 Static Reserve Requirements
Figure 3 shows the distributive implications of operating the different levels of static reserve ratio
in stochastic model. A similar result for the steady state of the model is shown analytically in
Appendix D, for a plausible range of parameters (for the case of no banking constraints, for
simplicity). We now consider the model with a benchmark of monetary policy alone. We show
that there is a welfare trade-off between borrowers and savers. In both cases, borrowers tend
to increase welfare gains as reserve ratio increases. By contrast, savers tend to decrease welfare
as the level of reserve ratio increases. In aggregate, total household welfare exhibits a minimal
gain given that the gains by borrowers offset the losses by savers. These results underscore
that a higher reserve ratio increases costs for banks as only a portion of the available deposits
can be used for lending activities. As banks have less funds to lend, they also reduce excessive
risk-taking. From doing so, it is able to eliminate extending loans to subprime borrowers and
reduce the probability of default as shown in Figure 4. However, banks accumulate less profits in
the process which are then remitted to savers as owners of banks. Savers also earn lower returns
on deposits as fewer funds are intermediated. Meanwhile, worthy borrowers enjoy a stable flow
of credit as probability of default decrease with higher reserve ratio. This narrative reflects
why savers experience welfare losses and borrowers increase welfare gains when the reserve ratio
increases.
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Figure 4: Probability of Default at Different Levels of Reserve Ratio
4 Model Analysis
4.1 Optimal Policy
What criterion should policy makers use to determine the parameter values in both (52) and
(53)? One option is to follow Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) and make stabilisation of the
economy the goal of monetary and macroprudential policy. Instead we opt for a policy that
maximises a population-weighted aggregate measure of welfare across the two types of agents
and then consider the distributive welfare impact these policies generate.
First, we solve the benchmark version of the model—where neither monetary policy or
macroprudential policy is employed—using second-order approximations, and then calculate































This process is then repeated again, with the macroprudential policy using the reserve ratio
activated, to generate the utility measures Ωi,RR, i = B,S. To calculate the welfare impact of
implementing monetary (MP), or macroprudential policy (RR), or both (MPRR), in terms of
consumption equivalents, we follow Ascari and Ropele (2012) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2014) to derive consumption equivalents—the constant fraction of consumption, each type of
agent would sacrifice in order to obtain the benefits of the policy:
CEB = exp
[
(1− βB)(ΩB,j − ΩB)
]




(1− β)(ΩS,j − ΩS)
]
− 1, j ∈ {MP,RR,MPRR} (61)
and the total welfare effect, which is the population weighted sum of the two:
CE = (1− λ)CEB + λCES . (62)
Historically, central banks set both policy interest rates and required reserve ratios. However,
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, as governments have looked for tools beyond traditional
monetary policy to help stabilise the economy with special emphasis on the financial system.
In the UK, these macroprudential tools are situated within the monetary authority—both the
Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Authority operate under the aegis
of the Bank of England. By contrast, the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US is
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and of the ten voting members only the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve represents the central bank. The European Systemic Risk Board occupies a
middle ground. It is independent of the European Central Bank but is chaired by its President.
The vice president of the ECB is a voting member of the board, as are the governors of the
Eurozone national central banks alongside a representative of the EU and several other European
institutions. We therefore follow Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) and consider whether
situations might arise where two different agencies, a central bank setting monetary policy and
a macroprudential policy agency might cooperate, or given the different tools at their disposal,
operate independently without any cooperation in a way that might be detrimental to stability
or welfare.
We compute the parameters associated with both the monetary (52) and macroprudential












rrq) = arg max CE(ρr, φπ, φy, φrry, φrrsb, φrrq), (63)
the two sets of parameters are optimised jointly and under noncooperation we assume each
























Table 4: Optimising Parameters
Policy rule coefficients
ρr φπ φy φrry φrrsb φrrq
NP baseline 0 1.0001 0 0 0 0
MP 0.466 1.054 0.069 0 0 0
MP(10%) 0.466 1.054 0.069 0 0 0
MP(30%) 0.466 1.054 0.069 0 0 0
RR(10%) 0 1.0001 0 0.634 0.496 1.092
RR(30%) 0 1.0001 0 0.634 0.496 1.092
MPRR(10%) 0.653 1.736 0.171 0.370 0.257 0.326
MPRR(30%) 0.646 1.742 0.181 0.359 0.246 0.318
NP means no policy (policy rate is fixed at a constant real value). MP means monetary policy only. RR means only reserve
ratio rule operates. MPRR means monetary policy plus reserve ratio rule.
Several things emerge from the results in Table 4. In Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014),
stabilisation rather than consumer welfare is the goal and in the noncooperative case each
agency minimizes its own loss function; the parameters in the cooperative and noncooperative
cases differ. Here since both agencies are maximising consumer welfare, what emerges is that the
parameters for both cases are the same.11 This means it does not matter whether the two policies
fall within the remit of the central bank as in the UK, or macroprudential policy is managed
by an independent agency as in the US or the EU. Moreover, the parameters associated with
optimal monetary policy remain the same whether or not this type of macroprudential policy is
operating or not.
It is no surprise that when macroprudential policy operates on its own (RR(10%) and
RR(30%)), in the absence of active monetary policy, the parameters associated with this
policy, φrry, φrrsb and φrrq in (53) are larger than when macroprudential policy accompanies
monetary policy (MPRR(10%) and MPRR(30%)). This is particularly the case for φrrq, which
determines the response of the reserve ratio to deviations from steady state house prices. By
contrast, the parameters associated with the Taylor rule (52), ρr, φπ and φy, appear larger
11The cooperative and noncooperative solutions are the same due to the noncooperative solution just being a
team solution as both policymakers have identical welfare functions to maximise. If there were a high probability
of violating the ZLB (which we do not have in this model), then we would have introduced a cost in the central
bank’s objective function that would have penalised deviations from steady state interest rate, and likewise for
macroprudential - penalising deviations from steady state reserve ratio. Then their objective functions would
have been distinct.
23
when monetary policy operates alone (MP) rather than together with macroprudential policy.12
However, the response of the central bank to inflation is nearly identical across the three regimes
(MP, RR(10%) and RR(30%)) once we consider the impact of the higher rate of interest rate
smoothing in the presence of macroprudential policy. However, the central bank should behave
more aggressively when setting policy in response to deviations in output when it can do so in
tandem with macroprudential policy.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
We use the parameters in Table 4 to generate impulse response functions (IRFs) in response to
the two of three shocks associated with the housing sector that together account for 43% of the
variance in real GDP and nearly all the variance in loans in Table 3. We view these two variables
(housing risk shock in Figures 5 and 6 and housing demand shock in Figures 7 and 8) as the
main proxies for credit cycles. We also generate IRFs for shocks to technology and demand in
the nondurable goods sector in Figures 9 to 12 as they together account for 54.7% of the variance
in GDP. In each case we consider how output, consumption, prices, loan activity, investment,
interest rates and banks’ net worth vary, differentiating between the impact of policy on the
behaviour of borrowers and savers when monetary policy operates alone (MP), macroprudential
policy operates on its own with steady state reserve requirements of 10% (RR(10%) and 30%
(RR(30%)), and where monetary policy and macroprudential operate in tandem with steady
state reserve requirements of 10% (MPRR(10%) and 30% (MPRR(30%)). All are juxtaposed
against a baseline case of no policy (NP) where there is no macroprudential policy or required
reserve ratio and the policy rate is fixed at a constant real value.13
Figures 5 and 6 show what happens when the standard deviation of housing quality in
(17) temporarily increases due to a shock equivalent to 11.79% (one standard deviation in the
shock process). The distribution of housing quality becomes more skewed to the left, prompting
more borrowers to default on their loans. Banks’ net worth decline, and their balance sheets
deteriorate. As their leverage ratios increase, banks offer fewer new loans and charge higher
interest rates. Though savers take advantage of the decline in house prices and invest in more
housing, this is not enough to compensate for the decline in borrowers’ investment and overall,
12The response of policy to output and inflation shocks is larger given that the relevant coefficients are multiplied
by 1-ρr.
13For the case of no policy (NP) and macroprudential policy alone (RR(10%) and (RR(30%), we set the
coefficients in (52): ρr=0, ρry=0 and ρrπ=1.0001, keeping the real policy rate nearly fixed while ensuring saddle
path stability of the economy. The IRFs in Figures 5 to 12 are calculated for 20 quarters. The IRFs for 100
quarters, Figures 13, 14 and 17 to 20, and 200 quarters, Figures 15 and 16 can be found in the Appendix, Section
E.
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fewer houses are built.14 Output drops and so does inflation, prompting a decline in the policy
rate and further increasing the interest spread.
When monetary policy operates alone, the high coefficient on inflation and low coefficient
on output in the optimised rule Table 4 means that the central bank immediately lowers the
policy rate by 5.4 basis points and keeps it there for an additional period in the second period
in response to the 0.08% drop in nondurable goods inflation. By contrast, if the policy rate
is kept fixed at its steady state real value, the drop in inflation is greater and so is the initial
response. However, the policy rate recovers more quickly whereas when the Taylor rule operates,
the policy rate remains low for longer.
Figure 5 also demonstrates that macroprudential policy, even if it operates completely on its
own, stabilises the economy by dampening the financial accelerator mechanism thus performing
a role similar to monetary policy. However, the negative risk shock has a differential impact on
savers and borrowers; despite the decline in output, the consumption of the former increases on
impact and remains high for six quarters while borrowers’ consumption bears the full impact
of the downturn. A policy that relies on macroprudential policy only to stabilise the economy
slightly ameliorates this effect. Macroprudential policy, either on its own, where the reserve
requirement drops on impact from 10% to 9.92% or from 30% to 29.78%, or when combined with
monetary policy (MPRR(10%) and MPRR(30%)) in Figure 6, where the reserve requirement
drops on impact from 10% to 9.96% or from 30% to 29.89%, stabilises the economy and more
generally, as we shall see in Section 4.3, also generates a small overall welfare benefit to borrowers
at the expense of savers. This differential impact accelerates as the ratio shifts higher from 10%
to 20% to 30% as it does when reserve ratios are static in Figure 3.
Figures 7 and 8 show the response of the economy to a negative one standard deviation shock
to the housing preference parameter. The initial impact on GDP is similar to the impact from
the risk shock, but GDP carries on declining for another quarter. Overall, the impact of the
demand shock lasts for a very long time, far longer than the impact from the risk shock and so
the recovery is much slower (see Figures 15 and 16). Total investment drops on impact by 0.1%
and then continues to decline for another three quarters before slowly recovering. Total loans
decline on impact and then carry on declining for 21 quarters before they begin to recover, but
even after 100 quarters are still 1.06% below their steady state level and bank’s net worth still
only three-quarters of the way recovered from their lowest point in quarter 30.
House prices drop, causing the value of collateral to decline. This triggers a higher default
probability, immediately decreasing banks’ net worth. However, the countervailing impact of the
sharp 50 basis points increase in the lending rate means that initially, net worth recovers during
14Figures 13 and 14 show that over the course of the first decade, investment by borrowers and particularly
savers, oscillate around their steady state values in response to the risk shock.
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Figure 5: IRFs with Housing Risk Shock (Deviations from Steady State)






























































































































Figure 6: IRFs with Housing Risk Shock (Deviations from Steady State)





























































































































Figure 7: IRFs with Housing Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 8: IRFs with Housing Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 9: IRFs with Non-Durable Technology Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 10: IRFs with Non-Durable Technology Shock (Deviations from Steady
State)
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Figure 11: IRFs with Non-Durable Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 12: IRFs with Non-Durable Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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the first four quarters, before declining once again for another 23 quarters before beginning to
recover. As is the case for the risk shock, the demand shock on investment causes investment in
housing, disaggregated between savers and borrowers to oscillate for years to come. On impact,
investment by savers declines by 0.1%, declines still further for two more periods, reaching 0.13%
below its steady state value. It then recovers so that by the tenth quarter it is 0.86% below
steady state and then declines once again for a further 19 quarters (Figures 15 and 16) before
finally converging back to steady state.
The long-lasting impact of the demand shock on the housing and banking sectors means that
whereas the monetary authority will respond with a sharp but short-lived drop in policy rate,
the response of macroprudential policy will leave reserve requirements below their steady state
values for decades. When macroprudential policy operates alone, the reserve ratio requirement
drops on impact from 10% to 9.9% or from 30% to 29.7% and then declines still further for
another three quarters till it reaches 9.8% (RR(10%)) or 29.4% (RR(30%)). Even after 40
quarters the reserve requirements are still 9.9% and 29.7%, respectively.
Neither macroprudential policy nor monetary policy when operating in the absence of the
other are able to do much to mitigate the impact of the demand shock. Only when they operate
in tandem in Figure 8 is there a discernible impact on the economy—particularly in reducing
the drop in total loans. This happens because though the reserve requirements drop less than
when macroprudential policy operates without monetary policy, the presence of macroprudential
policy prompts the central bank to lower its policy rate more aggressively and for longer than it
would choose to do if it were operating alone. While the impact of the demand shock on house
prices is an order of magnitude larger than the impact generated by a risk shock, macroprudential
policy is only effective in mitigating the latter.
Turning to the nondurable goods sector, Figures 9 and 10 show the response of the economy
to a positive one standard deviation shock to nondurable technology. As is the case for other
models with habit persistence in consumption (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005a),
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Leith, Moldovan and Rossi (2012)), the shock produces the
hump-shaped rise in output that resembles that generated by VAR models.
Nondurable inflation falls on impact due to the decline in real marginal costs, while the
relative price of house increases. The distribution of housing quality becomes less skewed to the
left prompting fewer borrowers to default on their loans. Banks’ net worth increases, and their
balance sheets improve. As their leverage ratios decrease, banks offer more loans and charge
lower interest rates. Both savers and borrowers increase consumption and investment. In the
case of the latter, the shock generates particularly long-lasting oscillations in investment as seen
in Figures 17 and 18.
As with demand shocks, neither macroprudential policy nor monetary policy, when operating
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in the absence of the other, are able to do much to mitigate the impact of a nondurable technology
shock in Figure 9. Note in particular that the response of monetary policy to the positive shock
is expansionary—though output increases the central bank responds more aggressively to the
drop in inflation and lowers policy rate by 4.5 basis points. As house prices, credit and output
all increase, the macroprudential authority does implement countercyclical policy, by raising the
reserve ratio to 10.05% (RR(10%)) or 30.14% (RR(30%)) in the absence of monetary policy
and 10.02% (MPRR(10%)) or 30.05% (MPRR(30%)), moderating somewhat, the impact of the
shock on banks’ net worth, the lending rate and the total amount of lending.
Finally, in Figures 11 and 12 we consider the impact of a negative demand shock in the non-
durable sector. The negative impact on consumption for savers and borrowers is roughly similar
though the latter do recover more quickly. House prices increase on impact by 0.13% and increase
further till the fourth quarter, when they reach 0.24% above their steady state value. Rather
than substitute from nondurable consumption to housing in response to the shock, the higher
prices are enough to deter savers from investing in housing— they choose more leisure instead.
At the same time the lending rate declines by 18 basis points—enough to induce borrowers to
invest in what are temporarily more expensive homes.
Unlike the case for the technology shock, here the demand shock on nondurable inflation
generates countercyclical declines in both the policy rate and the reserve ratio in Figure 11.
Furthermore, particularly in the case of monetary policy, the two appear to reinforce each other.
Hence, by the fourth quarter the policy interest rate drops by 3 basis points if monetary policy
operates in isolation and 5 basis points if macroprudential policy is activated as well. This effect
compounds the increase in total loans and nondurable inflation but smooths the impact of the
shock on banks’ net worth and borrowers’ investment.
4.3 Welfare
Monetary policy, when analysed in New Keynesian models, is generally found to mitigate, but
only to a small degree, the negative impacts on agents’ welfare generated by stochastic shocks
to the economy (Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015), Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012),
Cantore et al. (2019), Tayler and Zilberman (2016), Levine, McAdam and Pearlman (2012)).
Here, the limited efficacy of monetary policy is even more acute—in Table 5 implementation
of the optimised Taylor rule (52) yields an overall welfare benefit equivalent to only a 0.001%
permanent increase in consumption for both types of agents. Why so small? In steady state,
savers spend 47% and borrowers 52% of their incomes on nondurable goods and the rest is
invested in housing. Nonetheless, we assume the central bank’s optimal Taylor rule only responds
to the rate of nondurable goods inflation, as this is the closest analog to rates of change in the
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traditional consumer price index. Under these circumstances, introducing a housing sector
lessens the scope for traditional monetary policy tools to improve welfare.
Adding a fixed reserve requirement alongside monetary policy generates a larger effect on
total welfare and a significant differential impact on borrowers and savers. The consumption
equivalent welfare gain to borrowers is 0.075% at the expense of a 0.04% loss to savers if the
reserve requirement is fixed at 10% (MP(10%)) and a 0.301% gain for borrowers at the expense
of a 0.167% loss if fixed at 30% (MP(30%)). At the baseline steady state reserve requirement
of 10%, the total impact on welfare of macroprudential policy, either on its own (RR(10%)),
or in conjunction with monetary policy (MPRR(10%)), reaches consumption equivalents of
0.003% or 0.006% respectively. If the steady state reserve requirement is set as high as 30%, the
consumption equivalents are 0.014% and 0.017%, well over an order of magnitude higher than
the impact of monetary policy alone. Moreover, these are the net effects from aggregating across
our two types of agents and obscures the policy’s differential impact. The small total welfare
effects are the residual gains that accrue to the economy’s borrowers from macroprudential policy,
after the losses suffered by the economy’s savers are accounted for. Macroprudential policy alone
generates a benefit to borrowers equivalent to 0.073% (0.301%) of permanent consumption at
the expense of savers who suffer a loss equivalent to 0.041% (0.170%) for RR(10%) (RR(30%)).
The addition of monetary policy improves these welfare effects to only a marginal degree. These
are still small numbers, but they demonstrate that once we incorporate housing and banks into
our model, macroprudential policy alone is more effective than monetary policy in mitigating
the welfare effects of shocks and combining monetary policy with either a fixed reserve ratio, or
better still, macroprudential policy is best in terms of total welfare.
Table 5: Interaction of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Regulation
Model Consumption equivalent welfare(%)
Savers Borrowers Total
MP 0.001 0.001 0.001
MP(10%) -0.040 0.075 0.005
MP(30%) -0.167 0.301 0.015
RR(10%) -0.041 0.073 0.003
RR(30%) -0.170 0.301 0.014
MPRR(10%) -0.040 0.078 0.006
MPRR(30%) -0.168 0.307 0.017
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4.4 The Loss Functions of Policy Authorities
Beyond welfare, how much can these different regimes reduce the volatility of key macroeconomic
and financial variables? In Table 6, total loans volatility reduces from 28.3% in the no
policy case to 27.7% when monetary policy is introduced. Meanwhile, introducing a fixed
reserve requirement in addition to monetary policy with no macroprudential policy being
activated reduces total loans volatility to 27.5% and 26.6% in MP(10%) and MP(30%),
respectively. Macroprudential policy applied on its own, reduces this to 28.0% (26.8%) in
RR(10%) (RR(30%)). When the two policies are combined the volatility of total loans reduces
to 26.9% (25.8%) in MPRR(10%) (MPRR(30%)). Monetary policy alone, also reduces volatility
of output and house prices and reduces it further if combined with macroprudential policy.
However these policies also exacerbate the volatility of inflation.
To better understand these trade-offs we compute the loss functions for monetary and
macroprudential policy as in Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014). The macroprudential policy
maker minimises the volatility of credit growth, output and to maintain consistency with (53),
house prices as well:







where σ2i represents the asymptotic variance of the target variables, while parameters κY,MaP ≥ 0
characterise the policymaker’s preferences over output. As in Angelini, Neri and Panetta
(2014), we set κrr=0.1— they demonstrate it must be strictly positive to ensure that the policy
instrument is not too volatile. The monetary policy loss function is:





and as in Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014), we set κY,MP=0.5 and κR=0.1.
In Table 6 we see how the reduction in the loss function is largest when monetary and
macroprudential policy operate together and the reserve ratio is highest. Whether it is feasible
to impose a reserve requirement as high as 30% is beyond the scope of our analysis. Yet it is
encouraging to note that when combined with monetary policy, macroprudential policy with a
low steady state reserve requirement MPRR(10%)—similar to the observed reserve ratio in the
Eurozone—achieves a reduction in the loss function nearly as large as macroprudential policy
when it operates on its own with the much higher reserve requirement RR(30%).
5 Conclusion
Our DSGE framework combines housing default with reserve requirements. We then use this
model to examine how the interaction monetary policy and reserve requirements affect: (i) the
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Table 6: Loss Functions
Model Volatility (%) Loss Functions
π Y ∆R SB Q ∆rr MP MaP MaP
κY,MaP = 0 κY,MaP = 0.25
NP 0.179 3.053 0.203 28.295 5.461 0.000 4.696 830.409 832.739
MP 0.190 3.000 0.186 27.739 5.454 0.000 4.539 799.198 801.448
MP(10%) 0.189 3.000 0.186 27.476 5.453 0.000 4.538 784.683 786.933
MP(30%) 0.185 3.000 0.183 26.625 5.452 0.000 4.537 738.640 740.889
RR(10%) 0.178 3.054 0.201 27.976 5.461 1.118 4.698 812.592 814.923
RR(30%) 0.173 3.056 0.197 26.849 5.460 3.311 4.702 751.761 754.095
MPRR(10%) 0.191 2.982 0.213 26.937 5.448 0.440 4.487 755.311 757.534
MPRR(30%) 0.192 2.974 0.213 25.795 5.447 1.252 4.462 695.193 697.403
Note: The volatility of the select variables are computed from a 1000-period simulation having all shocks active.
credit and business cycle; (ii) the distribution of welfare between savers and borrowers; and (iii)
the aggregate welfare when these policies are optimised together or separately. The model is
calibrated using euro area data.
Our results show there are distributive implications of operating the different levels of reserve
ratio where borrowers tend to increase welfare gains at the expense of savers. These results
suggest that a higher reserve ratio increases costs for banks which induces them to restrict
loans to subprime borrowers, reducing the probability of default. Less financial intermediation
means that savers earn lower returns on deposits, while eligible borrowers enjoy a stable flow
of credit as the probability of default is inversely related to the reserve ratio. We also show
that a central bank setting monetary policy and a macroprudential policy agency need not
coordinate—they can operate independently without any detriment to stability or welfare.
Furthermore, we demonstrates that macroprudential policy, even if it operates completely on
its own, stabilises the economy when a negative risk shock occurs, by dampening the financial
accelerator mechanism. Meanwhile, neither macroprudential policy nor monetary policy when
operating in the absence of the other are able to do much to mitigate the impact of a demand
shock in the nondurable sector. Only when the two operate in tandem is there a discernible
impact on the economy—particularly in reducing the drop in total loans. We also find that
the total impact on welfare of macroprudential policy, either on its own, or in conjunction with
monetary policy, is generally small but they demonstrate that once we incorporate housing
and banks into our model, macroprudential policy is more effective than monetary policy in
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mitigating the welfare effects of shocks. At the same time, the reduction in the loss function is
largest when monetary and macroprudential policy both operate with a high reserve ratio.
While the results show that the reserve ratio can influence credit and real economic activity,
the magnitude of the impact could be dependent on specific characteristics of an economy.
We also realise that some extensions are relevant for future work, in particular, examining the
impact of macroprudential regulation, including the reserve ratio, when occasionally binding
constraints are introduced to incorporate the effective lower bound in nominal interest rates.
Still, the model does provide some evidence that rather than reducing or eliminating reserve
requirements, policy makers might want to consider retaining them and indeed using them as a
basis for operating macroprudential policy.
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Appendices
A Saver’s optimisation problem


















































− βs%t+s + βs+1%t+s+1(1− δ)
]
= 0; s ≥ 0 (A.4)
It+s : Et
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ιL − %t+sWCt+s] = 0; s ≥ 0 (A.6)





ιL − %t+sWDt+s] = 0; s ≥ 0 (A.7)
Putting s = 0 in (A.2), (A.4), (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7) and s = 1 in (A.3) and defining the



























































B Borrower’s optimisation problem















































































− βs%Bt+s + βB,s+1%Bt+s+1(1− δ)
]
= 0; s ≥ 0 (B.4)
IBt+s : Et
[

























ιL − %Bt+sWCt+s] = 0; s ≥ 0 (B.6)





ιL − %Bt+sWDt+s] = 0; s ≥ 0 (B.7)
Putting s = 0 in (B.2), (B.4), (B.5), (B.6), and (B.7) and s = 1 in (B.3) and defining the







RDt+1 + (1− F )RLt









































































































































































IB = δDB (C.13)



























LB,C = (1− α)LBQ
1





LB,D = (1− α)LBQ
1





ωa = ωp (C.22)
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CTOTAL = λC + (1− λ)CB (C.23)
LC,TOTAL = λLC + (1− λ)LB,C (C.24)
LD,TOTAL = λLD + (1− λ)LB,D (C.25)
Y C = LC,TOTAL (C.26)
Y D = LD,TOTAL (C.27)
Y = Y C +QY D (C.28)
MCC = WC (C.29)

























rr = r̄r (C.35)



















Ω = 1− σB + σBΘφ (C.39)
D Steady State Effects on Welfare of rr Changes
For simplicity we focus on the case when there are no banking frictions.
D.1 Effect on ω̄:
The relationship between rr and ω̄ is given by
Z =
rrβb
































, where Φ is the
cumulative normal distribution.
It follows that ∂Z∂rr = (G/ω̄ + F )
βb

































(where φ is the normal probability density function, and we have used the result that
φ( logω̄σω −
σω




A reasonable assumption is that the threshold value ω̄ < 1; from (D.1) it is clear that ω̄ = 1
when µ = 2(1− rrβ
b
β ), so it follows that a sufficient condition for ω̄ < 1 is that µ > 2(1−
rrβb
β ).
Most calibrations of the agency parameter µ are of the order of 0.1, with β
b
β = 0.97, so that this
sufficiency condition holds over the range of rr we investigate. Noting that the term in square
brackets is 0 when ω̄ = 0 and that its derivative is increasing provided that (− logω̄σω −
σω
2 ) > 0,
it follows that it must be positive provided that ω̄ > e−
σ2ω
2 . Note also that this term is positive
at ω̄ = 1 provided that σω < 1.22. Thus provided that µ > 0.08 and σω < 1.22, this term is
positive, and therefore ∂Z∂ω̄ > 0.
It immediately follows that dω̄drr < 0.






































































Thus LB increases with G+ (F − 1
RL
)ω̄ = (1− βb)(G+ ω̄F ); the derivative of this with respect
to ω̄ is (1− βb)F > 0), and hence dLBdrr < 0.













































One can eliminate Q by multiplying (D.8) by Q
1+ 1
ιL and then adding to (D.7), to obtain

























and it is clear from this that dLdrr > 0.






















By inspection, we see that if Γ = ΓB, then Q, the price ratio, is a constant. Noting that
Γ− ΓB = γ
1− γ
(
1/β − 1 + δ
1− ε
− 1/β




and that a lower discount factor βB is likely to be associated with a smaller habit parameter
εB, the implication is that Γ − ΓB is small, and therefore that there is little variation in Q.15




(LB)−ϕ(α+ (1− α)Q1+1/ιL)ιL/(1+ιL) (D.13)
15Indeed, the percentage change in Q in the simulations is around 100 times smaller than those of any of the





L−ϕ(α+ (1− α)Q1+1/ιL)ιL/(1+ιL) (D.14)
DB = CB/ΓB/Q D = C/Γ/Q; (D.15)
with WC = 1 − 1/σ, that CB and DB increase with rr, and C,D decrease. With steady state
utilities given by
U = γlog(C−εC)+(1−γ)log(D)− L
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ




it is evident that the effect of an increase in reserve ratios, as given by rr, is to raise the utility
UB for the borrowers and reduce utility U for the savers.
E Long-Run IRF’s and Additional Results
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Figure 13: IRFs with Housing Risk Shock (Deviations from Steady State)





























































































































Figure 14: IRFs with Housing Risk Shock (Deviations from Steady State)



























































































































Figure 15: IRFs with Housing Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 16: IRFs with Housing Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 17: IRFs with Non-Durable Technology Shock (Deviations from Steady
State)
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Figure 18: IRFs with Non-Durable Technology Shock (Deviations from Steady
State)
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Figure 19: IRFs with Non-Durable Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 20: IRFs with Non-Durable Demand Shock (Deviations from Steady State)
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Figure 21: Welfare in Consumption Equivalent in Deterministic Model
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